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Abstract—The emerging cloud market introduces a multitude
of cloud service providers, making it difficult for consumers to
select providers who are likely to be a low risk from a security
perspective. Recently, significant emphasis has arisen on the
need to specify Service Level Agreements that address security
concerns of consumers (referred to as SecSLAs) – these are
intended to clarify security support in addition to Quality of
Service characteristics associated with services. It has been found
that such SecSLAs are not consistent among providers, even
though they offer services with similar functionality. However,
measuring security service levels and the associated risk plays an
important role when choosing a cloud provider. Data breaches
have been identified as a high priority threat influencing the
adoption of cloud computing. This paper proposes a general
analysis framework which can compute risk associated with
data breaches based on pre-agreed SecSLAs for different cloud
providers. The framework exploits a tree based structure to
identify possible attack scenarios that can lead to data breaches in
the cloud and a means of assessing the use of potential mitigation
strategies to reduce such breaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the advantages and rapid growth of cloud com-
puting, existing cloud environments are still not seen to be
sufficiently trustworthy by consumers. This framework enables
consumers to specify which security parameters are most
significant for them, enabling a subjective view to be formed
of different cloud providers.
There have been significant recent advances in cloud com-
puting – enabling providers to differentiate themselves on a
number of different factors primarily centered around capabili-
ties and costs. Security remains an important concern for many
users, particularly prevention of data breaches at the cloud
provider and the ability of a provider to interrogate data stored
at their systems. Many providers are consequently responding
to this security challenge by improving the types of security
mechanisms they support. Traditionally customers choose the
cloud provider based on metrics such as number and types
of CPUs (e.g. large vs. small instances), number and types of
virtual machines (e.g., Debian, CentOS), and storage space,
etc. Recent security breaches across the globe have changed
this trend and has prompted cloud providers to include security
attribute as part of above metrics. Various recent efforts
have attempted to specify these security parameters [2], [5]–
[7], [15], enabling customers to monitor whether particular
security constraints are being met (although this is not always
possible to measure, requiring the customer to often rely on
the advertised capability from the provider).
One of the drawbacks of this approach is that the customer
does not know the level of risk associated with security service
levels agreed by the cloud provider. Cloud providers generally
offer different levels of security. For example one cloud
provider offers a key size of 1024 bits for RSA encryption
and 256 bits for AES encryption, while another cloud provider
offers a key size of 2048 bits for RSA encryption and 128 bits
for AES encryption. Consequently, the risk associated with
the use of these two approaches are different. Cloud providers
and consumers (or clients) have advantages and disadvantages
with both of these combinations. The clients may be charged
differently depending on what they decide to use. However, it
would be more appropriate if this process was more closely
driven by consumer requirements.
In this paper we attempt to provide a framework to respond
to this challenge, by utilising a tree based model to assess risk
from a customer’s perspective. The framework identifies the
weaknesses in security provisions made by cloud providers
– by identifying possible attack routes or attack scenarios
for adversaries based on available security services. The
framework can be used as a decision support mechanism to
analyze the capability of the attack source and estimate the
likely impact of an attack route. The proposed work assigns a
number of attributes such as technical difficulty, cost to break
the system, and attack discovery to each leaf node of the tree
and aggregates them via multiple utility functions. Users can
prioritize on particular security attributes that are significant
for them by using a weighting/utility function which combines
the attributes of leaf nodes. Finally a route which shows high
risk is identified and notified to the customer.
Recently, Cloud Security Alliancea has identified a number
of vulnerabilities to the cloud computing and placed data
breach as the top threat to the cloud. A data breach is a security
incident in which sensitive, protected or confidential data is
copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen, or lost. Hence this paper
focuses on data breach threat in the cloud. In our tree based
architecture, data breach is the root node while a number of
branches and leaf nodes are defined to capture different types
aThe Notorious Nine, Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013,
http://tinyurl.com/mgt85e2
of data breach scenarios.
II. RELATED WORKS
The adoption of cloud computing (like other internet tech-
nologies) is often based on perceived risk by a customers [29]
– as essentially by outsourcing their systems to a cloud service
provider (CSP), the customer is placing trust in the provider
to deliver its advertised capability (both in terms of QoS
and security). In recent years, significant work has focused
on defining and deriving security service level agreements
(SecSLAs) [5], [16], [17], primarily quantifying such secu-
rity services into multiple levels and enforcing a strategy
to monitor whether the agreed level of services to a client
are actually being delivered. Here, establishing “trust” in
a provider remains important [30], [31], with trust being
classified into the following five categories: provision, access,
delegation, identity, and context. These categories define trust
relationships between a consumer and: (i) a service provider,
(ii) resources made available by the provider, (iii) a third-
party arbitrator, (iv) signed attributes, and (v) supporting
transactions.
Trust in cloud systems is often subjective and may be
calculated using a centralized or distributed approach. When
using a centralized approach, a single authority or trust broker
collects all ratings from consumers, computes a reputation
score for every participant, and makes all scores publicly
available. When using a distributed approach, there can be
distributed storages where ratings can be submitted, requiring
interaction between storages to compute a single trust value
for a given provider. A broker based trust model was proposed
in [1] based on SLA violation and user experience where
the authors exploited SLA and cloud characteristic parameters
such as CPU, number of virtual machines (VMs), and service
down time, for evaluating the trustworthiness of providers.
This approach is also robust against malicious group of en-
tities performing reputation based attacks. Recently, Ghosh et.
al. [26] proposed SelCSP, a risk model which enables clients
to select the most reliable CSP by using trustworthiness and
competence of each CSP to estimate the provider reliability.
SelCSP focuses on metrics such as number of CPUs and VMs,
down time and interaction.
Our focus in this paper is primarily on security related
metrics such as authentication, data confidentiality, access
control etc, using a model based on an attack tree [32].
Attack tree analysis is a process of analyzing how systems fail,
enabling the study of possible vulnerabilities within systems,
visualize those vulnerabilities and assign various weights to
determine which scenarios are most likely to occur.
Attack tree analysis has been extensively used in several
areas including software design models [33], Internet secu-
rity [34], computer security [35]. We use an attack tree based
approach to identify risk associated with a data breach in cloud
systems. The key contributions of this paper are two folds: (i)
a framework and an associated model to compute data breach
risk for multiple CSPs; and (ii) the use of the model to enable
consumers to prioritize (using weights/utlity) a set of security
protocols based on their particular use of cloud services.
III. TREE BASED FRAMEWORK
We make use of a tree-based technique, in which the event
at the root of the tree can be referred to as the (attack) goal
– i.e., the intended outcome from an attackers perspective.
The attack goal considered in this paper is data breach in
the cloud. This section focuses on identifying potential events
that are likely to contribute to such a data breach. Events can
be linked with an OR/AND relationship, where an OR-gate
shows that the output event occurs only if one or more of the
input events occur. The AND-gate shows that the output event
occurs only if all the input events occur. If one of those events
cannot be divided further, it is a leaf node of the underlying
tree. Otherwise, those events are gate nodes that are treated
as sub-goals separately and can be divided continually until
all the events become leaf nodes. Whether an event can be
further subdivided (i.e., an event may be a leaf node in an
attack tree, but a gate node in another one) depends on the
knowledge and experience of the security analyst who handles
the attack tree. In order to build a tree, we identify and derive
the causes for data breach into multiple types of events. At
a high level, data breach in the cloud can broadly be either
“active” or “passive”. If an adversary compromises the user’s
data via malicious activities then this is classified as an active
data breach. Conversely, if user data is lost due to reasons
other than direct malicious activities of an adversary, then this
can be classified as a passive data breach.
A. Active Data Breaches
Data in a cloud environment may go through the following
stages: (i) reside in storage for direct access/use; (ii) be in
transmission within and outside the cloud network; (iii) be
subject to contract establishment/negotiation with the cloud
provider; (iv) reside in non-production/use area – e.g., for
backup, design and test purposes. The cloud provider must
protect user data in all of these stages to avoid a data breach.
Fig. 1 depicts this scenario and denotes the required protection
mechanisms as P3, P4, P5, and P6. An adversary can try to
compromise the data through a vulnerability in the protection
mechanism. It is necessary for the cloud provider to consider
several levels of sub-protection, as described in the following
subsections.
1) P3: During data production: Most production envi-
ronments have established security and access restrictions to
protect against data breaches. Standard security measures can
be applied at the network level, the application level and the
database level. Physical entry access controls can be extended
by implementing multi-factor authentication schemes, such as
key tokens or even biometrics. However, these protective mea-
sures cannot be simply replicated across every environment
because the methods that protect data in production may not
necessarily meet the unique requirements for protecting non-
production environments.
G Data Breach P7 physical protection A1 data in non production A9 key management
P1 active data breach P8 virtual protection A2 data sanitization A10 secure server virtualization
P2 passive data breach P9 physical destruction A3 authentication A11 multi-tenant architecture
P3 during data production P10 crypto shredding A4 data encryption A12 overwrite
P4 during data transmission P11 within host A5 network protection A13 use strong magnet
P5 during data storage P12 between hosts A6 unauthorized access A14 delete keys
P6 after data deletion A7 storage encryption A15 disaster management
A8 access control A16 retention policies
Fig. 1. Tree based model to access the of risk of data breach in cloud computing.
Non-production environments are used for design, devel-
opment, and test activities internally within an organization.
The risk of an unauthorized user getting access to the non-
production environment is high. The user’s data become vul-
nerable when it is moved to a non-production environment for
testing purposes e.g., the user or service provider updates an
application and uses real data to test the new functionality. This
vulnerability can be mitigated or reduced if the cloud provider
makes use of one of the following mechanisms: avoid the use
of real user data for testing or anonymise the data before its
use. As shown in Fig. 1, these two aspects constitute the leaf
nodes of P3.
2) P4: During data transmission: User data may need to
be moved between different entities/sites (e.g., different data
center locations) over time. A user may access the data on
a regular basis or third-party service providers may have
permission to access user data. Data will also move within a
cloud providers infrastructure, e.g., the user retrieves the data
from a storage server and performs operation via a locally
provisioned (i.e in the same data center) virtual machine.
The cloud provider needs to authenticate users who request
data access. During transmission, the data also needs to be
encrypted. As shown in Fig. 1, authentication, data encryption,
and network protection can be leaf nodes of P4.
3) P5: During data storage: The cloud provider may:
control physical access (P7) and/or digital access (P8) to the
data server. Limiting digital access is often complicated and
requires further breakdown as follows: how to protect the data
within a host machine (P11), i.e., if an adversary and user
are residing on the same host and protection is carried out
between hosts (P12), i.e., adversary and user are resident on
different hosts. As shown in Fig. 1, leaf nodes of P11 are
access control and key management techniques while those
of P12 are secure server virtualization and focus on execution
over a multi-tenant architecture.
4) P6: After data deletion: We assume that data is consid-
ered completely destroyed when deleted from the drive, and
they cannot be recovered by any means – thereby assuming
that content discovery tools can no longer read data in the
archive. We consider two data removal/ destruction techniques
here although the analysis identified here could be generalised
to other techniques. A popular techniques currently used is
Crypto Shreddingb. This methodology relies less on physical
access to storage, but instead involves deliberate destruction
bhttp://tinyurl.com/oxl55y6
of all encryption keys for the data and the destruction of the
encryption protocol itself. The keys are made unrecoverable by
rotating the key for active storage and shredding it. It follows
that archival data is also destroyed once the keys become
unavailable. Another secure data destruction methodology is
disk/free space wiping and physical destruction. This option
is available if the cloud backup vendor enables a user to have
limited access to the physical storage or includes this service
as part of the procedure for management of the data drives.
The software tool must be used to overwrite the data one to
three times. Degaussing or the use of strong magnets is then
used for scrambling data in hard drives so that data becomes
unrecoverable. Complete destruction of the physical storage
devices and shredding the magnetic media are also undertaken
in some instances.
B. Passive Data Breaches
A passive data breach involves data loss due to natural (fire,
earthquakes, flood) and/or man made (terrorism) disasters.
Cloud providers usually implement several capabilities to
reduce the risk of data loss. In general, data centers are built
in clusters and located in various global regions. In case of
failure, automated processes move user data traffic away from
the affected area. Deploying a disaster recovery programme
is also important to mitigate the risk of outages or data loss
in the cloud. The basic requirement for data centers is to fea-
ture fire protection systems such as smoke detectors (passive
protection) and fire sprinkler systems or a clean agent (active
protection). To protect against earthquakes, the data center’s
racks need to be bolted down and use seismic restraints,
and the facility must have multiple layers of redundancy.
Emergency backup generators need to be made flood proof,
and there needs to be enough fuel stored to last for days.
A cloud provider using a varied set of protection mechanisms
against diasters will have greater chance of reducing data loss.
This is captured by leaf nodes A15 and A16 in Fig. 1. It is
important that the data center operators clearly identifies the
particular strategy they make use of.
IV. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Fig. 1 shows the required protection mechanisms in the
leaf nodes and how they are related. There are 16 leaf nodes,
hence 16 technically different security protocols are required
to stop the adversary to reach the root of the tree. Leaf
and intermediate nodes are connection with AND-/OR-gates
to reach the root. Consider a path which is composed of
multiple leaf nodes as an attack scenario. It is obvious that the
adversary’s strategy could be to exploit the weakest scenario
to compromise the data. Let us assign weights w1, w2, w3,
w4, w5, and w6 to the intermediate nodes P1, P2, P3, P4, P5,
and P6, respectively in Fig. 1. These weights will be used by
clients to prioritize their interest. Section V provides the effect
of these weights, suggesting how they will be used to combine
the attack risk probabilities based on the following conditions:
w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, ≥ 0, (1)
w1 + w2 = 1, (2)
w3 + w4 + w5 + w6, = 1. (3)
lower case letters represent attack risk probability at leaf or
intermediate nodes and root node. For example, g denotes
the risk probability that an attack reaches the root node
G. Similarly, p1 denotes the risk probability that an attack
reaches the intermediate node P1, while a1 denotes the risk
probability that an attack compromises the security protocol
in leaf node A1. Using OR/AND-gate we can combine the
risk probabilities. The output of the attack risk probability of
OR-gate is maximum of inputs while the output of AND-gate
is the multiplication of inputs. According to these rules and
w > 0 and w1 + w2 = 1, the attack risk probability for data
breach is given by:
g = max(w1p1, w2p2), (4)
p1 = max(w3p3, w4p4, w5p5, w6p6) (5)
p2 = a15a16 (6)
p3 = a1a2 (7)
p4 = a3a4a5 (8)
p5 = max(p7, p8) = max[a6a7,max(p11, p12)],
= max(a6a7, a8a9, a10a11), (9)
p6 = p9p10 = max(a12a14, a13a14), (10)
p8 = max(p11, p12) = max(a8a9, a10a11). (11)
From (4)–(11), g can be obtained in terms of ai ∀i as follows:
g = max(w1w3p3, w1w4p4, w1w5p5, w1w6p6w2a15a16),
= max(w1w3a1a2, w1w4a3a4a5, w1w5a6a7, w1w5a8a9,
w1w5a10a11, w1w6p9p10, w2a15a16),
= max(w1w3a1a2, w1w4a3a4a5, w1w5a6a7, w1w5a8a9,
w1w5a10a11, w1w6a12a14, w1w6a13a14, w2a15a16).
(12)
TABLE I
PROBABILITIES FOR POSSIBLE DATA BREACH SCENARIOS.
Data Breach
Scenarios Leaf nodes Probability
S1 A1, A2 w1w3a1a2
S2 A3, A4, A5 w1w4a3a4a5
S3 A6, A7 w1w5a6a7
S4 A8, A9 w1w5a8a9
S5 A10, A11 w1w5a10a11
S6 A12, A14 w1w6a12a14
S7 A13, A14 w1w6a13a14
S8 A15, A16 w2a15a16
From (12) we observe eight possible data breach scenar-
ios, and Table IV illustrates these attack scenarios at the
corresponding leaf nodes and identifies their associated risk
probabilities. Consider N cloud providers with the attack risk
probability associated with the nth provider being gn where
n = 1, . . . , N . A consumer must therefore chose a provider
that offers the minimum of the maximum attack risk. This is
given by
RiskLessCloud = argmin
n
{max(gn)}. (13)
More than one leaf node must be compromised to reach
the root node of the tree. To compromise the leaf node many
aspects such as the possibility to succeed, attack cost, difficulty
of the required technique, risk of being detected, and so on
have to be considered. In this paper, we calculate the attack
risk probability by assigning leaf nodes three attributes: attack
cost, technical difficulty and the probability to be discovered.
In Table II, we divide each attribute into one of five levels.
However, we use different non-linear utility functions (shown
later) to convert these linear gradings into more practical non-
linear gradings.
TABLE II
PROBABILITIES FOR POSSIBLE DATA BREACH SCENARIOS.
Cost to break Difficulty Discovery
Cost (1000) Grade Difficulty Grade
Probability
of Detection Grade
> 10 5
quite
difficult 5
quite
difficult 1
6− 10 4 difficult 4 difficult 2
3− 6 3 medium 3 medium 3
0.5− 3 2 simple 2 simple 4
< 0.5 1 quite simple 1 quite simple 5
A cloud provider can offer different types of security
techniques for each leaf node e.g., for leaf node A1, a
cloud provider can either allow or disallow the data to be
made available in a non-production environment. Similarly
for leaf node A2, different anonymization techniques such as
k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy
could be used by the cloud provider. A great deal of efforts
has gone into defining and quantifying techniques for each
leaf node in literature. Several standardization bodies such as
Cloud Security Alliance, Cloud Standard Customer Council,
ENISA, IEEE Cloud Computing Standard Study Group (IEEE
CCSSG), ITU Cloud Computing Focus Group, Distributed
Management Task Force (DMTF), Storage Networking Indus-
try Association (SNIA), Open Grid Forum (OGF), Open Cloud
Consortium (OCC), and Organization for the Advancement
of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) are working on
standardizing security SLAs for cloud. In this paper, we have
combined their efforts in Table III where we categorize these
techniques into two directions: vertically we assigned each
technique into one of the leaf nodes while horizontally we
assign gradings in ascending order.
We emphasize here that the contribution of this paper is to
come up with a model to evaluate the overall risk in a CSP and
the potential risk for a data breach. The tree model proposed
in Fig. 1 will clearly need to evolve over time as the number
of leaf nodes and the number of attack scenarios increase.
Hence the details on Table III will be adapted accordingly.
Our emphasis here is on the proposed methodology, which
can be generalised through the identification of additional
potential risks and mitigation strategies. After associating a
technique with a leaf node, multi-attribute utility theory can be
adopted to aggregate attack risk probability [27]. Accordingly
to such a multi-attribute utility, let us define the weight and
utility function for each attribute. Let zi denote the weights
and ui[Al(x)] denote utility functions, where i = 1, 2, 3,
l = 1, . . . , 16; and let x represent grades associated with the
leaf node Al. Hence the aggregated attack risk probability is
given by:
al = z1 × u1[Al(x)] + z2 × u2[Al(x)] + z3 × u3[Al(x)],
l = 1, . . . , 16, x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (14)
where
z1 + z2 + z3 = 1. (15)
If there are N cloud providers then each of them offers one
of the techniques from Table III for each leaf node. A client
can obtain gradings for all three attributes using Table II and
calculate the attack risk probability for each leaf node using
(14). Risk probability for a data breach is then calculated using
(4). This procedure will be repeated for all N cloud providers
using the same values of zi and wi. A cloud which is then
less vulnerable to a potential data breach can be selected using
(13).
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the proposed model by consid-
ering different values for the weights – based on a priority set
by a user. Let us introduce utility functions which map the
linear gradings given in the Table II into a non-linear domain.
Utility functions can be defined in many ways but in this paper
we consider the following three functions for attributes cost,
technical difficulty, and detection, respectively (and represent
risk probability associated with a provider):
u1(α) = 10
1−α;u2(α) = α
−1;u3(α) = 10
1−α (16)
where α ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Fig. 2 shows the relation between
three functions for different gradings. From Fig. 2, the risks
associated with attributes cost, detection, and technical diffi-
culty are monotonically increasing for the same grading, i.e.,
u1(2) < u3(2) < u2(2).
Let us consider an example scenario with five different
cloud service providers (CSPs) to evaluate the model. The
gradings (based on technical difficulty) for each leaf node
for each CSP are provided in Table IV. CSP 1 offers the
worst security SLA in terms of technical difficulties while
CSP 5 offers the best security SLA. The other three CSPs
offer intermediate security SLAs.
If we consider only the technical difficulty attribute for leaf
nodes, then z1 = 1, z2 = 0, and z3 = 0. For this simple case
let us simulate the attack risk probability by assigning equal
values for other weights, i.e., wi = 1, ∀i. Fig. 3 shows the
risk probabilities for all attack scenarios. Risk probabilities for
CSP 1 is high in all attack scenarios while the risk reduces
gradually for all other CSPs. For CSP 2, the risk associated
TABLE III
DIFFERENT OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR A CLOUD PROVIDER. THE GRADES IN THE TABLE REPRESENT THE RELATIVE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY (1− EASY
TO BREAK AND 5−VERY DIFFICULT TO BREAK).
Grade 1 2 3 4 5
A1 Yes No
A2 k−anonimity l−diversity t−closeness differential privacy
A3
service provider
assertion
authentication
federation
user name and TLS
client certificate
user name and two
factor authentication
limited access over
dedicated link
A4
legacy SSL and TLS
- 128−bits
TLS (Version 1.2 or
above)- 128−bits
legacy SSL and TLS
- 256−bits
TLS (Version 1.2 or
above)- 256−bits
A5
community WAN
service
encrypted community
WAN service IPsec VPN gateway
bonded fibre optic
connections
bonded fibre optic
connections with
TLS
A6 video surveillance
two-factor biometric
authentication
monthly access
reviews
A7
only physical
protection
keys are with cloud
provider
keys are with
third-party server keys are with client
A8
coarse-grained
role-based access
control
fine-grained
role-based access
control
attribute-based access
control (ABAC)
ABAC and
community network
ABAC and private
network
A9
keys are managed by
cloud provider
keys are managed by
third-party
keys are managed by
users
A10
application
virtualization desktop virtualization user virtualization storage virtualization
hardware
virtualization
A11
database-based
segmentation
hypervisor-based
segmentation VM Introspection
penetration test
certificates
A12 reuse without caution overwrite multipletimes
free space wiping
and physical
destruction
pass content
discovery test
A13 No Yes
pass content
discovery test
A14 no key-rotation delete keys
A15 no protection fire protection fire and waterprotection
fire, water, and
earthquake protection
fire, water,
earthquake, and
anti-terrorism
protection
A16
backup at same
location
backup at multiple
locations
backup at multiple
locations everyday
backup at multiple
locations every hour
instant backup at
multiple locations
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Fig. 2. Risk values for various utility functions for
grades change between 1–5.
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Fig. 3. Risk probabilities for attack scenarios when
only one attribute (technical difficulty) considered
for leaf nodes.
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Fig. 4. Attack risk probability for different
weights.
with scenarios 3 and 4 is high. Hence, according to Table IV,
the attacker will exploit leaf nodes 6 and 7, or leaf nodes 13
and 14 to compromise the data via scenario 4 or scenario 7,
respectively.
Let us now evaluate the effect of weights wi for the cases
considered above. Fig. 4 shows the attack risk probabilities
when w1 varies between 0 and 1, w2 varies between 1 and 0,
while w3 = w4 = w5 = w6 = 0.25, based on the preferences
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(a) z1 = 1/3, z2 = 1/3, z3 = 1/3 (b) z1 = 1/2, z2 = 1/4, z3 = 1/4 (c) z1 = 1/4, z2 = 1/2, z3 = 1/4
Fig. 5. Risk probability (without scaling) values for five CSPs against the eight data breach routes shown in the Table II.
TABLE IV
FIVE DIFFERENT CSPS HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO EVALUATE THE PROPOSED
MODEL. GRADE VALUES HAVE BEEN CHOSEN FROM TABLE III.
CSP 1 CSP 2 CSP 3 CSP 4 CSP 5
A1 1 1 1 5 5
A2 1 2 3 5 5
A3 1 2 3 4 5
A4 1 2 2 4 5
A5 1 2 3 4 5
A6 1 1 3 5 5
A7 1 1 3 4 5
A8 1 2 3 4 5
A9 1 1 3 5 5
A10 1 2 3 4 5
A11 1 1 3 4 5
A12 1 2 3 5 5
A13 1 1 3 5 5
A14 1 1 1 5 5
A15 1 2 3 4 5
A16 1 2 3 4 5
identified by a user. Fig. 4 clearly demonstrates that the risk
values are constantly changing. When w1 > 0.8 (i.e. high
priority for active attack and data loss due to passive attack
being unimportant for the client) then the risks associated with
CSP 1 and CSP 2 are the same. In this case, the client can
choose CSP 2 since they need to pay less for CSP 2 than CSP
1 for the same level of risk. However, the risk associated with
CSP 1, CSP 2, and CSP 3 is much lower than CSP 4 and CSP
5.
The risk probability will be different if we consider a greater
number of attributes for each leaf node. Let us now simulate
the proposed model by considering all three attributes, with
wi being a constant and 0 < zi < 1. Fig. 5 shows the risk
probabilities for three different combinations of zi. The first
row of Fig. 5 shows the individual probability for each attack
scenario while the second row shows the data breach risk
(i.e., maximum value out of eight scenarios). In Table II, it
is assumed that the probability of discovering an attack on a
highly secure protocol is low [28]. CSP 4 and CSP 5 provide
highly secure protocols compared to other CSPs. Hence when
z3 is high (i.e., high priority given for detecting an attack),
the risk associated with CSPs 4 and 5 are high compared to
others. This clearly shows that the risk cannot be measured
based on a single attribute.
From the second row in Fig. 5, the risk of data breach asso-
ciated with CSPs 1 and 2 are always higher than others CSPs.
It clearly shows that a security protocol which is difficult to
compromise is always important for a cloud provider. Both
CSPs 4 and 5 use such protocols, however, CSP 5 has greater
protection than that of CSP 4 in terms of technical difficulty
in compromising data (see Table IV). Even though the risks
associated with CSPs 4 and 5 are almost the same and much
lower than other CSPs, in some instances the risk associated
with CSP 5 is higher than CSP 4 (see second row of Fig. 5).
The proposed model can be used by a user/ client to choose
the right CSP based on their requirement (i.e. by consideration
of different weights to obtain a model similar to Fig. 5).
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a risk model to characterise data breach for
cloud service providers, enabling users to identify parameters
of most concern to them and provide a weighting function
to prioritise them. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to
aggregate risk probabilities across the measured parameters.
This model enable a user/ client to choose a cloud provider
who offers lower risk compared to others based on the same
criteria. More importantly, our model enables a client to
prioritize security parameters that are most important for their
application by assigning different weights. We use numerical
analysis to demonstrate that the data breach risk will be
varying based on security SLAs as well as based on clients
requirements. Our model can be extended as additional moni-
toring tools become available, enabling extension of the attack
tree parameters considered in this work. The analysis proposed
here also enables a better comparison to be carried out across
multiple cloud providers, enabling an objective assessment by
a user.
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